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Abstract
Human infants, like immature members of any species, must be highly selective in sampling information from their
environment to learn efficiently. Failure to be selective would waste precious computational resources on material that is
already known (too simple) or unknowable (too complex). In two experiments with 7- and 8-month-olds, we measure
infants’ visual attention to sequences of events varying in complexity, as determined by an ideal learner model. Infants’
probability of looking away was greatest on stimulus items whose complexity (negative log probability) according to the
model was either very low or very high. These results suggest a principle of infant attention that may have broad
applicability: infants implicitly seek to maintain intermediate rates of information absorption and avoid wasting cognitive
resources on overly simple or overly complex events.
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Introduction
Human infants face two daunting problems as they begin to
learn about their surroundings. First, they enter the postnatal
world with only rudimentary mechanisms–provided by their
evolutionary heritage–for interpreting environmental information.
Second, the potential information available in the environment is
both voluminous and complex. These two problems led William
James to coin his famous phrase about ‘‘the blooming, buzzing
confusion’’ that confronts the newborn [1]. Nonetheless, infants
show remarkable feats of learning, beginning in the last trimester
of fetal life, continuing through the perinatal period, and
accelerating through infancy and early childhood [2–5]. Infants
are able to extract the statistical properties of their environment in
a diverse array of learning tasks and domains, including sounds,
words, people, shapes, and objects [6–11]. But how is it that
infants are able to learn efficiently in such a complex environment?
One solution is to have a small set of innate biases; for example,
seeking to look at and listen to biologically significant stimuli such
as faces and speech. However, innate biases alone cannot be the
solution for the vast majority of stimuli from which infants must
learn. Given the slow time-course of evolution, we also need
general purpose learning mechanisms to deal with a changing
environment and with classes of stimuli that could not plausibly be
processed by a small set of specialized mechanisms.
Here, we focus on this general-purpose learning mechanism by
avoiding the use of special stimuli and asking whether infants
deploy a sensible (and likely implicit) strategy for allocating
attention to arbitrary, neutral stimuli. Our goal is to determine
whether infants are biased to gather information from the
environment in a principled way that serves as a key component
of an efficient learning mechanism [12,13]. Specifically, we
provide evidence that infants avoid spending time examining
stimuli that are either too simple (highly predictable) or too complex
(highly unexpected) according to their implicit beliefs about the
probabilistic structure of events in the world. Rather, infants
allocate their greatest amount of attention to events of in-
termediate surprisingness–events that are likely to have just enough
complexity so that they are interesting, but not so much that they
cannot be understood. This approach builds on a longstanding
tradition in developmental psychology, as exemplified by Piaget
[13]. He argued that when children are confronted with a new
piece of information, they initially attempt to incorporate it within
their existing knowledge structures through a process of assimilation.
When this is not possible, children either fail to learn new
structures (and move on to sample other information) or they
adapt by creating new knowledge structures, a process he called
accommodation.
Piaget had no objective measure of assimilation or accommo-
dation; they remained hypothetical constructs. However, in
subsequent research, a proxy for these theoretical constructs
centered on the relative duration of visual attention to objects or
events varying in complexity or familiarity. Many researchers have
speculated about what underlying mental operations are indexed
by infants’ looking times or attentional patterns [14] (for review,
see Aslin 2007 [15]). The generally accepted view is that looking
times reflect some combination of (a) stimulus-driven attention, (b)
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and the past stimuli. If infants are presented with an already
familiar stimulus, they prefer it over a novel stimulus, but quickly
tire of it after a brief period of re-familiarization (habituation), and
subsequently show preferences for novel stimuli. Similarly, if
repeatedly exposed to an initially novel stimulus, infant looking
times decline and then recover to the presentation of another novel
(i.e., completely unfamiliar) stimulus. Theoretical accounts for
these familiarity and novelty preferences all share a common
theme: As infants attempt to encode various features of a visual
stimulus, the efficiency or depth of this encoding process
determines their subsequent preferences. Familiarity preferences
arise when infants have not yet completed encoding the familiar
stimulus into memory, or when the novel stimulus is too dissimilar
from the infants’ existing mental representations to be readily
encoded [16–22].
However, these theories lacked an objective measure of the
relevant independent variable–an event’s complexity or relationship to
existing representations. Instead, researchers overwhelmingly relied on
qualitative judgments of stimulus complexity to select materials to
test infants’ visual preferences. These qualitative judgments relied
on inferences about infants’ existing mental representations, to
which researchers had no direct access. With no reasonable way of
modeling infants’ existing representations, it was impossible to
quantitatively measure the complexity of the information con-
veyed by a particular stimulus. Thus, researchers had only post hoc
estimates of stimulus complexity–those obtained by measuring the
very patterns of visual preferences that the theories were designed
to predict. Two exceptions are Civan, Teller & Palmer 2005 [23]
and Kaldy & Blaser 2006 [24] in that both papers quantified the
perceptual salience of visual stimuli in order to effectively
demonstrate its importance in eliciting infants’ preferences for
novel versus familiar stimuli.
We overcome these problems by formalizing a notion of
stimulus complexity and behaviorally testing the relationship
between complexity and infants’ probability of looking away at
each successive point in a sequence of events. We assume that
at each point in the experiment–and in everyday life–infants
have used observed data to form probabilistic expectations
about what events are likely and unlikely to be observed next
[25,26]. We model these expectations using an idealized
observer model of our experimental stimuli. We then measure
complexity as the negative log probability of an event according to
this idealized model. This measure quantifies each event’s
information content [27]. (This measure has also been called
surprisal [28], since it may also be interpreted as representing the
‘‘surprise’’ of seeing the outcome.) We show that infants
preferentially look away at events that are either very simple
(high probability) or very complex (low probability), according
to the idealized model. Intuitively, high probability events
convey little information–infants’ attentional resources are best
spent elsewhere. Low probability events may indicate that the
observed stimuli are unlearnable, unstructured, or difficult to
use predictively in the future. Negative log probability also
quantifies the number of bits of information an ideal observer
would require to encode that sequence of events in memory.
Thus, infants may avoid stimuli that require encoding too much
information or information that could only be extracted by
prolonged attention to rare events, thereby incurring a higher
processing cost than shifting attention to less complex events.
Experiment and Modeling Approach
The behavioral experiment measured the point, in a sequence
of events, when an infant looked away from a visual display.
The displayed stimuli were easily captured by a simple statistical
model. In Experiment 1, we presented each infant with 42
unique animated displays, each featuring one of 42 uniquely
colored and patterned boxes occluding one of 42 unique
familiar objects (e.g., a ball). Each scene display began with the
occluder rising and falling, thus appearing to reveal and then
re-obscure the object hidden behind it (Fig. 1(a) and Video
S1). To maintain infants’ attention early in the experiment, the
first reveal always showed an object. For example, a blue polka-
dotted occluder might rise to reveal a toy fire truck. On
subsequent reveals, the same object appeared in the box
according to some probability randomly assigned to that trial.
For example, if a trial were associated with the probability of
0.3, then 30% of the time an object would be present behind
the box. Probabilities ranged from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.05
(i.e., 0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, etc.), such that there were 21 possible
probabilities-of-appearance that could be associated with an
object on a particular trial. The sequences of object reveals thus
varied in terms of their information-theoretic properties: some
events in a sequence were highly predictable (e.g., a ball
appears still in the box after having appeared on each of ten
previous reveals), and others were less predictable (e.g., a rattle
appears to have disappeared from within the box after having
appeared on each of the ten previous reveals). The objects,
boxes, and order in which the probabilities-of-appearance were
presented were randomized across infants, and each of the 21
probabilities-of-appearance occurred twice (for a total of 42
trials). Each animated sequence of events continued until the
infant met the look-away criterion, which was defined as gaze
directed off-screen for greater than 1 consecutive second (see
Video S3 for look-away example). To address uncertainty
about infants’ mental representations and their age-related or
uniquely individual processing speeds and biases for stimulus
salience, we exhaustively randomized and counterbalanced all of
these extraneous variables (e.g., sequence order, object identity,
object familiarity, spatial location).
We modeled the sequences of reveals using a Markov Dirichlet-
multinomial model (MDM). The Dirichlet-multinomial is a general-
purpose statistical model that uses observed event counts to
compute a posterior distribution for an underlying multinomial
distribution on events. The Dirichlet-multinomial makes para-
metric assumptions about the form of the prior probability and the
likelihood of an event and is often used in Bayesian statistics
because of its computational simplicity (see Materials and Methods).
We apply this to a time-series of events by making a Markov
assumption that each event is statistically independent (i.e., not
dependent on the ordering of the preceding events). Thus, the
model can take some previously observed sequence of events–
corresponding to an individual infant’s observations before they
have looked away–and compute the probability of every possible
next event. We hypothesize that infants’ probability of looking
away at the next event in a sequence is at least partially
determined by the information-theoretic properties of that event,
according to the model. Specifically, at each point in a sequence of
events, the model assigns each event a probability, and the
negative log of this probability provides a natural information-
theoretic measure of the complexity of the next event according to
the model’s current expectations about which events are likely.
Fig. 2 illustrates the logic of the experiment and analysis. In the
first example, the observer sees a sequence of four A events in
a row. In this case, the observed data consist of entirely A’s. These
data are combined with the prior–essentially a smoothing term to
avoid zero probabilities–to form an updated posterior belief with
high probability of A but non-zero probability of B (‘‘Updated belief’’
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event is determined using this posterior, which represents the
model’s updated belief about the true distribution of events. Thus,
if the next event is an A–an event that is highly likely according to
the model’s posterior–the complexity of that event would be low
(i.e., the event would be highly predictable according to the
model). We hypothesize that infants would be more likely to look
away at this event. Conversely, if the previous observations assign
A very low probability (second example), A will have very high
complexity (i.e., the event would be highly surprising according to
the model) and infants should terminate the sequence of events by
looking away. If the previous observations make A moderately
likely (third example), the occurrence of an A event will convey
a ‘‘Goldilocks’’ amount of information, leading infants to be less
likely to look away. If infants do not look away, then the modeling
step is repeated for the next item in the sequence. This means that
infants may look away at different points in different sequences,
but we predict systematicity in these look-aways: regardless of how
far into a sequence an infant has made it without looking away,
their probability of looking away on the next object will depend on
its complexity, conditioning on all previous observations.
We note that this type of modeling and analysis contrasts with
most previous infant studies, which typically tested for differences
in overall mean looking times. Here, we are predicting a binary
outcome (whether an infant looks away) at each individual event in




Fig. 3 shows infants’ probability of looking away, as a function
of that event’s negative log probability according to the model, and
collapsing across infants, sequences, and sequence positions. The
diamonds show raw probability of look-away, binning complexity
into 5 discrete bins. The curve represents the fit of a Generalized
Additive Model [29], which attempts to find a smooth relationship
between complexity and look-away probability. This figure shows
a U-shaped relationship between infant look-away probability and
the on-line model-based estimate of complexity, with infants
looking away from events that are especially predictable or
especially surprising. There is a ‘‘Goldilocks’’ value of complexity
Figure 1. Examples of visual displays used in Experiments 1 and 2. a) The object (e.g., a toy fire truck) in the box for Experiment 1 was
revealed (or not) by up-down animation of an occluder (e.g., a blue polka-dotted box). b) In Experiment 2, one of three unique objects (e.g., a baby
bottle) popped up from behind one of three highly distinctive boxes. Also see Videos S1 and S2 for examples of animated displays used in these
studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.g001
Figure 2. Schematic showing several example event sequences and how the ideal observer model combines observed events with
a simple prior to form expectations about upcoming events. The next event then conveys some amount of information according to these
probabilistic expectations, which is related to infants’ probability of look-away at a specific next event by a U-shaped function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.g002
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rate in this task.
Although the plot in Fig. 3 provides a revealing picture of the
relationship between indexes of complexity and looking durations,
there are likely other factors that influence when infants will look
away from the displays. For instance, low-information and high-
information events may tend to occur later in a sequence, after
learners have developed expectations about the distributional
properties of the events. If infants tend not to look away early,
perhaps because they are initially captured by the salience of the
display independent of its complexity, they would appear to
disprefer low and high complexity. To address this potential
confound, we performed a regression analysis that controls for the
influence of temporal and other factors on look-away probability.
When infants look away in a trial, they provide no more data for
the remainder of the trial. Because of this, such data violate the
independence assumptions of standard logistic (or linear) re-
gression. An appropriate model for this kind of data–used
primarily in biostatistics to study, for example, predictors of
mortality–is known as a survival analysis [30,31]. We used a type of
survival analysis known as a Cox regression, that measures the log
linear influence of predictors on look-away probability, while
respecting the fact that once infants look away they provide no
additional data on the same trial. Importantly, this regression also
controls for a baseline look-away distribution, which is fit non-
parametrically to the data, thereby removing the influence of an
average distribution of looking times before testing the significance
of the other predictors. We note that this regression does not
include subject effects, but we develop more sophisticated analysis
methods that include a range of subject effects in forthcoming
work [32].
We included a number of control covariates that could plausibly
influence infant look-aways using a stepwise procedure that only
added variables that improved model fit. These variables included
whether an object was present, whether the presence of the object
was the same as the previous reveal, how many sequences the
infant had already observed, and the uncertainty in the model
about the correct distribution of events. This was measured by the
differential entropy of the multinomial parameters in the MDM
model. We also included linear and quadratic complexity terms.
To aid in interpretation of the regression coefficients, complexity
was standardized before being squared (i.e., it was shifted and
scaled to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) to test for
a significant quadratic trend of complexity on look-aways. This
stepwise procedure revealed a significant effect only for squared
complexity (b~0:052,z~1:969,pv0:05), and no other variables
(see Table 1). This indicates that the U-shape observed in Fig. 2 is
statistically significant, even after controlling for an overall baseline
look-away distribution and the other potentially confounding
variables (see Materials and Methods). The magnitude of this effect
can be understood by considering eb~1:05, which is the factor that
the baseline look-away probability is multiplied by for each
increase in squared surprisal of 1 standard deviation from the
overall mean in the experiment. This effect is relatively small,
though statistically reliable.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, objects were either present or absent from
behind a single occluder. Perhaps a more typical context in real
life, though, is for different events to occur in a multi-object scene,
thereby allowing infants’ attention to be attracted to both
individual events and transitions between events. In Experiment
2, we presented each infant with 32 unique sequential-event
displays (Fig. 1(b) and Video S2). Each display presented an
animated scene consisting of three uniquely patterned boxes, each
concealing a unique familiar object (e.g., a cookie). The locations
of the three boxes for a given sequence were chosen randomly but
remained static throughout a scene. The box locations were
randomly shuffled between event sequences, but no more than two
boxes appeared on either half of the screen. Neither the patterns
on the boxes nor the objects were repeated across event sequences
so that each object-box pair was independent and unique. Each
event in a sequence consisted of an object that popped out of a box,
and then back into the box. Each event lasted 2 seconds in total
duration (1-second ‘‘pop-up’’, 1-second ‘‘pop-down’’). Events were
presented sequentially with no overlap or delay. The same 32
event sequences were presented to every infant. However, the
objects, boxes, and order in which the 32 event sequences were
presented were randomized across infants. This design ensured
that differences in looking times across event sequences were not
driven by differences in scene items or presentation order. Each
animated sequence of events continued until the infant met the
look-away criterion, which was defined as gaze directed off-screen
for greater than 1 consecutive second.
Results from Experiment 2 are shown in Fig. 4.A si n
Experiment 1, there is a U-shaped relationship between look-away
probability and complexity, as measured by the same MDM
model (assuming event independence) used in Experiment 1. The
Cox regression for Experiment 2 included all of the covariates used
in Experiment 1, except whether an object was present, since there
was always an object popping up from behind one of the three
boxes. However, because there are three different box-object pairs
in each scene, we also included covariates measuring whether the
current event is the first time an object has appeared from behind
a box, and a factor measuring how many objects have not yet
popped up. Results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. As in
Experiment 1, this analysis revealed significant effects of squared
complexity (b~0:269,z~2:47,pv0:013). Here, eb~1:308,
meaning that each increase of squared complexity 1 standard
deviation from the mean resulted in a look-away probability that
Figure 3. U-shaped curve for single-box display used in
Experiment 1. The solid curve represents the fit of a Generalized
Additive Model (GAM) [29] with binomial link function, relating
complexity according to the MDM model (x-axis) to infants’ look-away
probability (y-axis). The dashed curves show standard errors according
to the GAM. The GAM fits include the effect of complexity (negative log
probability) and the effect of position in the sequence. Note, the error
bars and GAM errors do not take into account subject effects. Vertical
spikes on the x-axis represent data points collected at each complexity
value. The red diamonds represent the raw look-away probabilities
binned along the x-axis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.g003
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that found in Experiment 1. There was also a significant linear
effect of complexity, indicating that the U is not symmetric about
the mean (b~{0:216,z~{2:291,pv0:05), and an effect of trial
number, likely representing effects of fatigue
(b~0:029,z~3:994,pv0:001), although this is small compared
to the complexity effects (eb~1:03).
We also applied the MDM model to the data from Experiment
2 under an assumption of event-order dependence. That is, instead
of treating every event as independent, we examined whether
look-aways were predicted by the immediately preceding event
(i.e., a transitional model). Fig. 5 shows that a U-shaped function
also describes this transitional model, and the Cox regression
confirms that this effect is highly significant
(b~0:356,z~4:27,pv0:001). This analysis also revealed an
effect of trial-number (b~0:027,z~3:645,pv0:001).
Finally, one can ask which of the two models better accounts for
infants’ behavior on the task in Experiment 2. The predictions of
the transitional and non-transitional models are difficult to
distinguish because they are closely related: Complexity of both
models is correlated at R~0:62 (pv0:001). However, if both are
entered into a Cox regression along with all variables found to be
significant, the transitional complexity is significant
(b~0:289,pv0:01), but the non-transitional complexity is not
(b~0:015,pw0:84). This provides strong evidence that infants
track transitional probabilities, but the null result for the non-
transitional model is difficult to interpret due to its correlation with
the transitional model and the noise inherent in infant data.
Table 1. Cox Regression Coefficients.
Covariate Coefficient exp(coefficient) Standard error Z-statistic P-value
Experiment 1
Squared complexity 0.052 1.05 0.026 1.969 0.049
Experiment 2 - Non-transitional model
Complexity 20.216 0.805 0.094 22.29 0.022
Squared complexity 0.269 1.308 0.109 2.47 0.013
Trial number 0.029 1.030 0.007 3.99 6.5.10
–5
Model uncertainty 0.261 1.298 0.174 1.50 0.13
Experiment 2 - Transitional model
Squared complexity 0.356 1.43 0.084 4.27 1.9.10
–5
Trial number 0.027 1.03 0.007 3.65 2.7.10
–4
First appearance 0.500 1.64 0.272 1.82 0.069
All variables found in Experiments 1 and 2 that were added by the stepwise procedure. Note that some non-significant variables are added because the stepwise
comparison is based on the Akaike information criterion [40]. These results reveal significant quadratic effects of complexity in both experiments. Complexity and
squared complexity were shifted and scaled to have mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 before being entered into the regression.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.t001
Figure 4. U-shaped curve for three-box display used in
Experiment 2. The solid curve represents the fit of a GAM, relating
complexity as measured by the non-transitional MDM (assuming event
independence) to look-away probability. Dashed curves show GAM
standard errors. The GAM fits include the effect of complexity (negative
log probability) and the effect of position in the sequence. Note, the
error bars and GAM errors do not take into account subject effects.
Vertical spikes on the x-axis represent data points collected at each
complexity value. The red diamonds represent the raw look-away
probabilities binned along the x-axis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.g004
Figure 5. U-shaped curve for three-box display used in
Experiment 2. The solid curve represents the fit of a GAM, relating
complexity as measured by the transitional MDM to look-away
probability. Dashed curves show GAM standard errors. The GAM fits
include the effect of complexity (negative log probability) and the effect
of position in the sequence. Note, the error bars and GAM errors do not
take into account subject effects. Vertical spikes on the x-axis represent
data points collected at each complexity value. The red diamonds
represent the raw look-away probabilities binned along the x-axis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036399.g005
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The results of the experiments reported here have important
implications for two interrelated hypotheses concerning infants’
attention. First, infants behave as if they are employing a principled
inferential process for learning about events in the world. The
particular MDM model used in our analyses took as inputs a series
of observed events or transitions between events to form
probabilistic expectations about what events are most likely to
occur in the future. The model was necessary to determine what
complexity a set of stimulus events conveys to an ideal observer. A
failure of either of these components–the probabilistic model or
the linking assumption that maps level of complexity onto looking
times–would have yielded null results.
Second, infants appear to allocate their attention in order to
maintain an intermediate level of complexity. A powerful feature
of our analyses was the ability, via the Cox regression, to control
for potential confounds such as the number of items that have not
appeared yet, item repeats, and an arbitrary baseline distribution
of look-away probabilities. To our knowledge, the hypothesis that
infants prefer a particular level of information has not been tested
while controlling for these other variables, and our analyses
therefore provide several methodological advances. Rather than
predicting infants’ average looking time to a stimulus, our analyses
predicted the precise event in a sequence when an infant would
terminate (i.e., look away from) the display. Although others have
observed U-shaped behavior in infants under some circumstances,
our results provide the first evidence that the information-theoretic
properties of a formal model provide a significant predictor of
infant look-aways, over and above the effects of other variables, for
a large set of arbitrary, neutral visual stimuli. Interestingly, this U-
shaped pattern is similar to those obtained with many earlier
models of visual attention based on depth of processing or
difficulty of encoding the stimulus [17–19]. This could indicate
that while earlier models did not computationally define the
stimulus properties they hypothesized as the mediators of infant
looking times (i.e., complexity), the properties they explored are
nevertheless relevant in guiding infants’ visual attention. Our
results also provide a formal account for why infants show novelty
preferences (when two test stimuli fall on the left half of the U-
shaped function, the stimulus with greater complexity elicits more
attention) or familiarity preferences (when two test stimuli fall on
the right half of the U-shaped function, the stimulus with lesser
complexity elicits more attention).
Similar hypotheses about how adults allocate their limited
resources in the language domain–for example, those supporting
a uniform information principle [33–37]–may suggest that what
we have observed in infants reflects a ubiquitous constraint across
domains and developmental levels. In addition, other theories
propose that learners allocate attention to stimuli containing just
the right level of complexity because optimal complexity triggers
just the right amount of ‘‘arousal’’ in the learner [38]. The U-
shaped function may result from the basic response properties of
neural systems [39], although determining the precise mechanism
will require further research.
In summary, our findings are consistent with theories that
suggest infants actively seek to maintain an intermediate level of
information absorption, avoiding allocating cognitive resources to
either overly predictable or overly surprising events. It is important
to note that we are not claiming that this Goldilocks effect is the
only factor in infants’ allocation of attention. Certainly, there are
species-typical preferences and effects of learning that can
dominate infants’ attentional behavior. We argue that when these
other factors are controlled for, there remains a significant U-
shaped effect of complexity that is well accounted for by our
model. Further investigation is required to determine how infants’
preference for intermediate levels of information affects the




All research was approved by the Research Subjects Review
Board at the University of Rochester (protocol RSRB00024570).
Parents volunteering their infants for the study were fully informed
of the study procedures and completed written informed consent
and permission forms in advance of the study.
Visual Stimuli
In Experiments 1 and 2, we presented infants with animated
displays depicting event sequences varying in their predictability.
All displays featured uniquely colored and patterned boxes (e.g.,
pink polka dots) that were animated to reveal unique familiar
objects (e.g., a ball; see Videos S1 and S2 for examples). A
Matlab script was used to generate each of the animated displays.
Neither the boxes nor the objects were repeated across event
sequences so that each object-box pair was independent and
unique. The objects, boxes, and order in which the event
sequences were presented were also randomized across infants.
This design ensured that differences in looking time across event
sequences were not driven by differences in scene items or
presentation order.
In Experiment 1, each animated sequence featured one unique
object occluded by one box. The box opened (1 second) and closed (1
second) repeatedly, each time revealing the contents of the box.
The object always appeared in the box on the first reveal event.
On subsequent reveal events, the object was either present or
absent depending on the predictability of the event sequence
selected for that trial (a value between 0 and 1). So, for example,
a single trial might feature a purple striped box occluding a small
toy train with a probability-of-appearance of 0.5. The sequence of
events (object appears =1, empty box =0) might be: 1, 1, 0, 1, 0,
1, 0, 1, 0, 0. The reveals were presented sequentially with no
overlap or delay. There were 21 unique probabilities-of-appear-
ance (increments of 0.05 between 0 and 1, e.g., 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,
…) and all were presented to each infant twice (42 trials in total) in
a random order.
In Experiment 2, each animated display featured three boxes of
three unique colors and patterns (e.g., yellow stripes, blue polka
dots, green stars), each concealing a unique object (e.g., a cookie,
a spoon, a car). The locations of the three boxes for a given
sequence were chosen randomly but remained static throughout
a scene. The box locations were randomly shuffled on the
screen between event sequences, with the constraint that no
more than two boxes appeared on either half of the screen.
Each event in a sequence consisted of one of the three unique
objects popping out from behind one of the three boxes (1
second), and then back into the box (1 second). Thus, the total
duration of each event was 2 seconds, and events were
presented sequentially with no overlap or delay. There were
32 unique event sequences that varied in the probability that
each of the three objects appeared from behind their respective
occluding boxes. Some sequences were simple (e.g., A, A, A, A,
A, A, …), while others were more complex (e.g., A, B, A, B, A,
C, …). All event sequences were presented to each infant (32
trials in total).
Infants Prefer Medially Complex Events
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The procedures for Experiments 1 and 2 were identical, with
two exceptions: the type of displays used (single-box in Experiment
1 and three-box in Experiment 2) and the number of trials
presented to each infant (42 in Experiment 1 and 32 in
Experiment 2). Each infant was seated on his or her parent’s lap
in front of a table-mounted Tobii 1750 eye-tracker. The infant was
positioned such that his or her eyes were approximately 23 inches
from the monitor, the recommended distance for accurate eye-
tracking. At this viewing distance, the 17-inch LCD screen
subtended 24632 degrees of visual angle. Each of the three boxes
was 565 degrees. To prevent parental influence on the infant’s
behavior, the parent holding the infant was asked to wear
headphones playing music, wear a visor, lower their eyes, and
abstain from interacting with their infant throughout the
experiment.
Each trial was preceded by an animation designed to attract the
infant’s attention to the center of the screen–a laughing and cooing
baby. Once the infant looked at the attention-getter, an experi-
menter who was observing remotely pushed a button to start the
trial. For each trial, an animated scene–featuring a single box in
Experiment 1, or three boxes in Experiment 2–was played. The
animated sequences of reveal events continued until the infant
looked away continuously for 1 second, or until the sequence timed
out at 60 seconds. The 1-second look-away criterion for trial
terminationwasautomaticallydeterminedbytheTobiieye-tracking
software. If the infant looked continuously for the entire 60-second
sequence, the trial was automatically labeled as a ‘‘time out’’ and
discardedbeforetheanalysis(2.4%oftrialsinExperiment1,5.4%of
trials in Experiment 2). If the trial was terminated before the infant
actually looked away, the trial was labeled by an experimenter as
a‘ ‘ false stop’’ and also discarded. False stops, as determined by
aseparatevideorecordingoftheinfant’sface,occurredasaresultof
the Tobii software being unable to detect the infant’s eyes
continuously for 1 second, usually due to the infant inadvertently
blocking the eye-tracker camera’s view of his or her own eyes with
head or arm movements (22.1% of trials in Experiment 1, and
20.7%oftrialsinExperiment2).Trialsinwhichtheinfantlookedfor
fewer than four events were also discarded, since it is presumed that
too few observations are insufficient for establishing expectations
about the distribution of events.
Subjects
In Experiment 1, 42 infants (mean =7.9 months, range =7.0 -
8.9) were included in the analysis. Forty-four infants were tested;
one infant was excluded due to excessive tiredness (he fell asleep
within the first few trials and could not be awakened), and one was
excluded due to fussiness. In Experiment 2, 30 infants (mean =7.6
months, range =7.0 - 8.8) were tested, and all participating infants
completed the study. In both studies, all infants were born full-
term and had no known health conditions, hearing loss, or visual
deficits according to parental report.
Ideal Learner Model
Intuitively, infants observe how many times each event occurs in
the world, and then use these event counts to infer an underlying
probability model of their observations. In Experiment 1, the two
possible events are that the screen lifts to reveal that an object is
either present or absent. In Experiment 2, there are three possible
events corresponding to which of three objects appears from
behind its box.
An observer who sees only a single event happen would not
likely infer that the single observed event is the only one possible
(i.e, has probability of 1); instead, observers likely bring
expectations to this learning task. In the MDM model used here,
this prior expectation is parameterized by a single free parameter,
a, which controls the strength of the learner’s prior belief that the
distribution of events is uniform. As a gets large, the model has
strong prior beliefs that the distribution of events in the world is
uniform; as a approaches zero, the model believes more strongly
that the true distribution closely resembles that of the empirically
observed event counts. In modeling, we chose a value of a=1,
corresponding to a uniform prior expectation about the distribu-
tion of events (with expected values 50-50 in Experiment 1 and 33-
33-33 in Experiment 2). However, the qualitative results–in
particular, the U-shaped relationship between complexity and
look-away probability–do not depend strongly on the choice of a.
Formally, suppose there are N events, x1,x2,...,xN, and the ith
event has been observed ci times. We are interested in estimating
(or scoring) a multinomial distribution parameterized by
h~(h1,h2,...,hN) where hi is the true (unobserved) probability










where B is a normalizing constant that depends on the ci and a:
That is, after observing each event type occur some number of
times, the infant may form a representation, h, of their guess at the
true distribution of events. Every distribution can be scored
according to Equation 1, allowing one to compute how strongly
a learner should believe that any particular h is the correct one.
We predict that infants’ likelihood of looking away at a current
event will depend upon the complexity of that current event,
which is determined by both the previously observed events and
the identity of the current event. We predict that events of either
very low complexity (highly predictable) or very high complexity
(highly surprising) will be more likely to trigger a look-away than
events with moderate complexity.
When the ith event occurs, the main variable of interest here is
its negative log probability according to the model. We compute
this by integrating over the above posterior distribution on h. This
corresponds to a measure of the information conveyed by
observing event i, according to an ideal Bayesian learner who
had seen all previous events. We predicted that infants would be
more likely to look away during events that contained either too
little or too much information, giving a U-shaped (quadratic)
relationship between this negative log probability measure and the
actual observed look-away probability.
Supporting Information
Video S1 An example of an animated single-box display used in
Experiment 1.
(MOV)
Video S2 An example of an animated three-box display used in
Experiment 2.
(MOV)
Video S3 A 7-month-old subject attending to a three-box display




We thank Johnny Wen for his help with Matlab programming; Holly
Palmeri, Laura Zimmermann, and Alyssa Thatcher for their help
Infants Prefer Medially Complex Events
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36399preparing stimuli and collecting infant data; Allyssa Abel, Madeleine
Chansky, Suzanne Horwitz, Katheryn Lukens, Maddie Pelz, Hillary
Snyder, Laura Socwell, Lindsay Woods, and Rosemary Ziemnik for their
help recruiting and scheduling subjects; and Michael Tanenhaus, Elissa
Newport, Josh Tenenbaum, Daphne Bavelier, Ed Vul, Matthew G.
McGovern, Katherine S. White, Dan Yurovsky, Roger Levy, Scott
Johnson, two anonymous reviewers, and members of CoCoSci, TedLab,
and the Aslin and Newport labs for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: CK STP RNA. Performed the
experiments: CK. Analyzed the data: CK STP. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: CK STP RN. Wrote the paper: CK STP RN.
References
1. James W (1890) The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
2. DeCasper AJ, Fifer WP (1980) Of human bonding: Newborns prefer their
mothers’ voices. Science 208: 1174–1176.
3. Rovee-Collier CK, Sullivan MW, Enright M, Lucas D, Fagan JW (1980)
Reactivism of infant memory. Science 208: 1159–61.
4. Siqueland ER, De Lucia CA (1969) Visual reinforcement of non-nutritive
sucking in human infants. Science 165: 1144–1146.
5. Stevenson HW (1972) Children’s Learning. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
6. Fiser J, Aslin RN (2002) Statistical learning of new visual feature combinations
by infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America 99: 15822.
7. Kirkham NZ, Slemmer JA, Johnson SP (2002) Visual statistical learning in
infancy: Evidence for a domain general learning mechanism. Cognition 83:
B35–B42.
8. Maye J, Werker JF, Gerken LA (2002) Infant sensitivity to distributional
information can affect phonetic discrimination. Cognition 82: B101–B111.
9. Saffran JR, Aslin RN, Newport EL (1996) Statistical learning by 8-month-old
infants. Science 274: 1926.
10. Saffran JR, Johnson EK, Aslin RN, Newport EL (1999) Statistical learning of
tone sequences by human infants and adults. Cognition 70: 27–52.
11. Saylor MM, Baldwin DA, Baird JA, LaBounty J (2007) Infants’ on-line
segmentation of dynamic human action. Journal of Cognition and Development
8: 113–128.
12. Berlyne DE (1960) Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity, volume 331. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
13. Piaget J (1970) Structuralism. New York: Harper & Row.
14. Fantz RL (1964) Visual experience in infants: Decreased attention to familiar
patterns relative to novel ones. Science 146: 668.
15. Aslin RN (2007) What’s in a look? Developmental Science 10: 48–53.
16. Dember WN, Earl RW (1957) Analysis of exploratory, manipulatory, and
curiosity behaviors. Psychological Review 64: 91–96.
17. Hunter MA, Ames EW (1988) A multifactor model of infant preferences for
novel and familiar stimuli. Advances in Infancy Research 5: 69–95.
18. Kinney DK, Kagan J (1976) Infant attention to auditory discrepancy. Child
Development 47: 155–164.
19. Roder BJ, Bushnell EW, Sasseville AM (2000) Infants’ preferences for familiarity
and novelty during the course of visual processing. Infancy 1: 491–507.
20. Rose SA, Gottfried AW, Melloy-Carminar P, Bridger WH (1982) Familiarity
and novelty preferences in infant recognition memory: Implications for
information processing. Developmental Psychology 18: 704–713.
21. Sokolov E (1963) Perception and the Conditioned Reflex. Oxford, England:
Pergamon.
22. Wagner SH, Sakovits LJ (1986) A process analysis of infant visual and cross-
modal recognition memory: Implications for an amodal code. Advances in
Infancy Research 4: 195–217.
23. Civan A, Teller DY, Palmer J (2005) Relations among spontaneous preferences,
familiarized preferences, and novelty effects: Measurements with forced-choice
techniques. Infancy 7: 111–142.
24. Kaldy Z, Blaser EA, Leslie AM (2006) A new method for calibrating perceptual
salience across dimensions in infants: the case of color vs. luminance.
Developmental Science 9: 482–489.
25. Te ´gla ´s E, Vul E, Girotto V, Gonzalez M, Tenenbaum JB, et al. (2011) Pure
Reasoning in 12- Month-Old Infants as Probabilistic Inference. Science 332:
1054.
26. Xu F, Garcia V (2008) Intuitive statistics by 8-month-old infants. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105:
5012–5015.
27. Shannon CE (1948) A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System
Technical Journal 27: 379–423.
28. Tribus M (1961) Thermostatics and thermodynamics: an introduction to energy,
information and states of matter, with engineering applications. New York: D.
Van Nostrand.
29. Hastie T, Tibshirani R (1990) Generalized Additive Models. Boca Raton:
Chapman and Hall/CRC.
30. Hosmer DW, Lemeshow S, May S (2008) Applied Survival Analysis: Regression
Modeling of Time-to-Event Data, Second Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
and Sons.
31. Klein J, Moeschberger M (2003) Survival Analysis: Techniques for Censored
and Truncated Data, Second Edition. New York: Springer-Verlag.
32. Piantadosi ST, Kidd C, Aslin RN (forthcoming) R) Rich methods for infant
looking times.
33. Aylett M, Turk A (2004) The smooth signal redundancy hypothesis: A functional
explanation for relationships between redundancy, prosodic prominence, and
duration in spontaneous speech. Language and Speech 47: 31.
34. Genzel D, Charniak E (2002) Entropy rate constancy in text. In: Proceedings of
the 40th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics.
Stroudsburg, PA: Association for Computational Linguistics. pp 199–206.
35. Piantadosi ST, Tily H, Gibson E (2011) Word lengths are optimized for efficient
communication. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 108(9): 3526–3529.
36. Jaeger TF (2010) Redundancy and reduction: Speakers manage syntactic
information density. Cognitive Psychology 61: 23–62.
37. Levy R, Jaeger TF (2007) Speakers optimize information density through
syntactic reduction. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 19:
849.
38. Yerkes RM, Dodson JD (1908) The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of
habit-formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology 18:
459–482.
39. Turk-Browne NB, Scholl BJ, Chun MM (2008) Habituation in infant cognition
and functional neuroimaging. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2: 1–11.
40. Akaike H (1974) A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control 19(6): 716–723.
Infants Prefer Medially Complex Events
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36399